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Abstract
We study the long-run relation between money, measured by inflation or interest
rates, and unemployment. We first document in the data a positive relation
between these variables at low frequencies. We then develop a framework where
unemployment and money are both modeled using microfoundations based on
search and bargaining theory, providing a unified theory for analyzing labor
and goods markets. The calibrated model shows that money can account for a
sizable fraction of trends in unemployment. We argue it matters, qualitatively
and quantitatively, whether one uses monetary theory based on search and
bargaining, or an alternative ad hoc specification.
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1 Introduction
We study the relationship between monetary policy, as measured by inflation or nom-
inal interest rates, and labor market performance, as measured by unemployment.
While this is an old issue, our focus differs from the existing literature by concentrat-
ing on the longer run — we are less interested in business cycles, and more in relatively
slowly moving trends.1 One reason to focus on the longer run is that it may well be
more important from a welfare and policy perspective. Many macroeconomists seem
obsessed with increases in unemployment, say, over the business cycle; we want to
redirect attention to what happens at lower frequencies, since avoiding a bad decade,
like the 1970s, from a labor marker perspective, probably matters a lot more than
smoothing out any given recession.
Another reason to focus on the long run is that economic theory has much cleaner
implications for what happens at lower frequencies, which are less likely to be clouded
by complications such as signal extraction problems and other forms of imperfect
information, or nominal stickiness and other rigidities. We abstract from such com-
plications to focus on the effect of inflation on the cost of carrying real balances for
transactions purposes. As Friedman (1977) put it: “There is a natural rate of unem-
ployment at any time determined by real factors. This natural rate will tend to be
attained when expectations are on average realized. The same real situation is consis-
tent with any absolute level of prices or of price change, provided allowance is made
for the effect of price change on the real cost of holding money balances” (emphasis
added). This is the effect studied here.
To begin, we want to know the facts about the relation between nominal variables
and the labor market. Using quarterly U.S. data from 1955-2005, Fig. 1.1 shows
1The standard way to define business cycle phenomena in modern macro (see e.g. the Cooley
1995 volume) is this: take a given time series yt; apply the HP (or some other) filter to get the
trend yTt ; and define the cyclical component by the deviation yDt = yt − yTt . Rather than yDt , the
object of interest in this study is yTt . This is not to say our model does not make predictions about
high-frequency behavior — an equilibrium generates yt for all t — but we are more confident about the
predictions for yTt because we abstract from some effects that may be relevant at higher frequencies,
as discussed below.
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scatter plots between inflation and unemployment, progressively removing more of the
higher frequency as we move through the panels by applying stronger HP filters. The
last panel alternatively filters the data using five-year averages. It is clear that after
filtering out the higher frequencies, there is a strong positive relationship between the
relatively slowly moving trends in these variables. Fig. 1.2 shows a similar pattern
using nominal (Aaa corporate bond) interest rates instead of inflation.2 Fig. 1.3
shows the time series instead of scatter plots. We conclude that (i) movements in
trend unemployment are large, and (ii) they are positively correlated with the trends
in the nominal interest and inflation rates. This is true for the period as a whole,
even if the relation sometimes goes the other way in the shorter run, including the
60s where a downward sloping Phillips curve is evident.3
We want to know how much we can account for in these observations using basic
economic theory. To this end, we build a general equilibrium model of unemployment
and money demand based on search frictions in labor and goods markets, abstracting
from nominal misperceptions and rigidities. As suggested by Friedman, to understand
the impact of monetary policy on the natural rate of unemployment, it seems impor-
tant to incorporate the effect of inflation on the cost of holding real balances, which
means we need a theory where the cost of holding money and hence the benefit of
holding money are made explicit. Additionally, it would seem good to have a theory
of unemployment that has proven successful in other contexts.
2This is no surprise, given the Fisher equation, which says nominal rates move one-for-one
with inflation, ceterus paribus. In the working paper Berentsen et al. (2008), and on the web at
http://www.wwz.unibas.ch/witheo/aleks/BMWII/BMWII.html, we update Lucas (1980) to show
the Fisher equation and quantity equations continue to hold up in the long run with more recent
data. The quantity equation suggests we should get similar pictures using money growth instead
of inflation or interest rates, and we show this is true, using M0, M1 or M2. We also make the
same point using different interest rates, including the T-Bill rate, using employment rather than
unemployment, and using an extended sample.
3See Beyer and Farmer (2007), Huag and King (2008) and the references therein for more formal
analyses of the data than we can present here. Huag and King in particular apply a band-pass filter
(as discussed in Christiano and Fitzgerald 2003) to the same data, and find a positive relationship
between unemployment and inflation for bands longer than the typical business cycle. They also
tested for multiple structural change at unknown dates. They conclude, “After accounting for breaks,
the sub-periods lead us to the same conclusion that the long run association of unemployment with
inflation is positive. Although we used different and more formal methods, our findings support the
position in BMW.”
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In recent years, much progress has been made studying both labor and monetary
economics using theories that explicitly incorporate frictions — in particular, search
and matching frictions, noncompetitive pricing, anonymity and imperfect monitoring,
etc. Models with frictions are natural for understanding dynamic labor markets and
hence unemployment, as well as goods markets and the role of money. However,
existing papers analyze either unemployment or money in isolation. One objective
here is to provide a framework that allows us to analyze unemployment and money
in an environment with logically consistent microfoundations. Although there are
various ways to proceed, in terms of different approaches in the literature, here we
integrate Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) with Lagos and Wright (2005). The result
is a tractable model that makes sharp predictions about several interesting effects,
including the positive impact of inflation or interest rates on unemployment.4
We then consider the issue quantitatively by calibrating the model and asking
how it accounts for the above-mentioned observations. Suppose for the sake of a
controlled experiment that monetary policy is the only driving force over the period
— i.e. assume counterfactually that demographics, productivity, fiscal policy, etc.
were constant. Given monetary policy behaved as it did, how well can we account for
movements in trend unemployment? We find that the model accounts for a sizable
fraction of the lower-frequency movement in unemployment as a result of observed
changes in trend inflation and interest rates. For instance, monetary policy alone can
generate around half of the 3 point increase in trend unemployment in the 70s, and
about the same fraction of the decline in the 80s. Money matters. However, we also
ask how this prediction is affected by innovations in payments, and conclude that in
the future money may matter less for unemployment.
Finally, we argue that it makes a difference that we model money using search-
and-bargaining theory, as opposed to an ad hoc cash-in-advance constraint, as follows.
4In his study of the Fisher and quantity equations, Lucas (1980) warns against making much
of a pattern between filtered inflation and unemployment, given the argument in Friedman (1968)
and Phelps (1969) that the long-run Phillips curve must be vertical, Following Freidman (1977), our
position is that a positive relation between inflation and unemployment is as much “an implication
of a coherent economic theory” as Lucas said the Fisher and quantity equations are.
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First, we consider a version where the goods market is frictionless except for cash-in-
advance, and show analytically that the channels through which money matters are
different than in our model. Second, not only are the channels qualitatively different,
we show that search-and-bargaining frictions are key to quantitatively accounting for
the observations of interest. Hence, while we like our framework because labor and
commodity markets are both modeled using logically consistent principles, this is not
just a matter of aesthetics — the substantive predictions of a model with these detailed
microfoundations are different from what one gets using an ad hoc approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe the model
and solve for equilibrium. Section 4 presents the quantitative analysis. Section 5
compares our model with cash-in-advance, and Section 6 concludes.5
2 The Basic Model
Time is discrete and continues forever. Each period, there are three distinct mar-
kets where economic activity takes place: a labor market in the spirit of Mortensen-
Pissarides; a goods market in the spirit of Kiyotaki-Wright; and a general market in
the spirit of Arrow-Debreu. We call these the MP, KW and AD markets, and as-
sume MP convenes first, then KW, then AD. As shown in Lagos-Wright, alternating
KW and AD markets makes the analysis much more tractable than, say, a model
with only KW markets, and we take advantage of that here. There are two types of
agents, firms and households, indexed by f and h. The set of h is [0, 1]; the set of
f is arbitrarily large, but not all are active at any point in time. Households work,
consume, and enjoy utility; firms maximize profits and pay dividends.
5Other recent attempts to bring monetary issues to bear on search-based labor models include
Farmer (2005), Blanchard and Gali (2005), and Gertler and Trigari (2006), but they impose nominal
rigidities, which we think are less relevant for longer-run issues. Lehmann (2006), Shi (1998,1999)
and Shi and Wang (2006) are closer to our approach, although the details are different. Rocheteau
et al. (2006) and Dong (2007) use similar monetary economics, but a different theory of unem-
ployment, Rogerson’s (1988) indivisible labor model; while that leads to some interesting results,
there are reasons to prefer Mortensen-Pissarides. Earlier, Cooley and Hansen (1989) stuck a cash-
in-advance constraint into Rogerson, as Andofatto et al. (2003) and Cooley and Quadrini (2004) do
to Mortensen-Pissarides. As mentioned, we discuss cash-in-advance models in Section 5.
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As in any MP-type model, h and f can match bilaterally to create a job, and e
indexes employment status: e = 1 if an agent is matched and e = 0 otherwise. We
define a value function for each market, U je (z), V je (z) and W je (z), which depend on
type j ∈ {h, f}, status e ∈ {0, 1}, real balances z ∈ [0,∞), and, in general, aggregate
state variables, but in the benchmark model fundamentals are constant and we focus
on steady states, so aggregate states are subsumed in the notation.6 We adopt the
following convention for measuring real balances. When an agent brings in m dollars
to the AD market, we let z = m/p, where p is the current price level. He then takes
zˆ = mˆ/p out of that market and into the next period. In the next AD market the
price level is pˆ, so the real value of the money is zˆρˆ, where ρˆ = p/pˆ converts zˆ into
units of the numeraire good x in that market.
2.1 Households
A household h in the AD market solves
W he (z) = maxx,zˆ
©
x+ (1− e)c+ βUhe (zˆ)
ª
(1)
s.t. x = ew + (1− e)b+∆− T + z − zˆ
where x is consumption, c the utility of leisure, w the wage, b UI benefits, ∆ dividend
income, T a lump-sum tax, and β a discount factor (without loss in generality, h
discounts between periods but not across markets within a period). Notice w is paid
in AD, even though matching occurs in MP. Eliminating x from the budget equation,
W he (z) = Ie + z +maxzˆ
©
−zˆ + βUhe (zˆ)
ª
, (2)
where Ie = ew + (1− e)(b+ c) +∆− T .
This immediately implies the usual simplification in LW-type models:W he is linear
in z and Ie, and the choice of zˆ is independent of z and Ie. Although it looks like
6For matched agents, the wage w is also a state variable, since it is set in MP and carried
forward to KW and AD; to reduce clutter this is also subsumed in the notation. In the Appendix,
where policy and productivity follow stochastic processes and unemployment varies endogenously
over time, we keep track of these plus w as state variables.
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zˆ could depend on e through Uhe , we will see below that ∂Uhe /∂zˆ and hence zˆ are
actually independent of e. This means that every h exits the AD market with the
same zˆ, at least given an interior solution for x, which holds if b+ c is not too small.
These results require quasi-linearity, which is valid here because utility is linear in
the numeraire good x, as in any standard MP model.7
In KW, another good q is traded, which gives utility υ(q), with υ(0) = 0, υ0 > 0
and υ00 < 0. In this market, agents trade bilaterally, and we assume at least some
meetings are anonymous to generate a role for a medium of exchange. Thus, suppose
h asks f for q in KW and promises to pay later, say, in the next AD market. If f does
now know who h is, the latter can renege without fear of repercussion; so f insists on
quid pro quo. If h cannot store or transport x, money has a role (see Kocherlakota
1997, Wallace 2001, Araujo 2004, and Aliprantis et al. 2007 for formal discussions).
To make money essential we only need some anonymous meetings — we need not rule
out all credit. Let ω denote the probability a random match is anonymous. For now,
as a benchmark, we set ω = 1 and return to the general case in Section 4.3.8
For h in the KW market,
V he (z) = αhυ(q) + αhW
h
e [ρ (z − d)] + (1− αh)W he (ρz), (3)
where αh is the probability of trade and (q, d) the terms of trade, to be determined
below. Using the linearity of W he , we can simplify this to
V he (z) = αh [υ(q)− ρd] +W he (0) + ρz. (4)
The probability αh is given by a CRS matching function M: αh = M(B,S)/B,
where B and S are the measures of buyers and sellers in KW. Letting Q = B/S be
7In fact, we get a degenerate distribution of zˆ as long as AD utility is x + Υe(x), where x is a
vector of other goods. Also, a recent extension by Liu (2009) allows the employed and unemployed to
value KW goods differently, leading to a two-point distribution, without complicating things much.
8The case ω = 0 is also of interest, embedding as it does a genuine retail sector, albeit a cashless
one, into the standard MP model. That case can be used to study many interesting interactions
between commodity and labor markets, including the effects of goods market regulation, sales taxes,
etc. on employment. One can also make ω endogenous, as in related models by Dong (2009), where
it is a choice of h, and Lester et al. (2009), where it is a choice of f . This is perhaps especially
important for large changes in inflation, where one might expect ω not to be invariant; for now ω is
fixed, but in Section 4.3 we allow it to change over time.
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the queue length, or market tightness, αh =M(Q, 1)/Q. We assume thatM(Q, 1)
is strictly increasing in Q, with M(0, 1) = 0 and M(∞, 1) = 1, and M(Q, 1)/Q is
strictly decreasing withM(0, 1) = 1 andM(∞, 1) = 0, as is true for most standard
matching functions (see e.g. Menzio 2007).
In equilibrium, every h participates in KW, so B = 1, and moreover every h
is identical from the viewpoint of f since they all have the same amount of money.
However, f can only participate in KW if e = 1, since an unmatched firm has nothing
to sell (given inventories are liquidated in AD as discussed below). Thus, αh =
M(1, 1−u), where u is unemployment entering KW. This establishes a first connection
between the goods and labor markets: consumers are better off in the former when
times are better, in the sense that u is lower, in the latter, both because the probability
of a trade is higher, and, in equilibrium, because this affects the terms of trade.
For h in the MP market,
Uh1 (z) = V
h
1 (z) + δ
£
V h0 (z)− V h1 (z)
¤
(5)
Uh0 (z) = V
h
0 (z) + λh
£
V h1 (z)− V h0 (z)
¤
, (6)
where δ is the job destruction rate and λh the job creation rate. Job destruc-
tionn is exogenous, but job creation is determined by another matching function
N : λh = N (u, v)/u =N (τ , 1)/τ , where τ = v/u is labor market tightness, with u un-
employment and v vacancies (one has to distinguish between ‘vee’ v for vacancies and
‘upsilon’ υ for utility, but it is always clear from the context). We make assumptions
on N similar toM. Wages are determined when f and h meet in MP, although they
are paid in the next AD market, and in on-going matches w can be renegotiated each
period.
It is sometimes convenient to summarize the three markets by one equation. Sub-
stituting V he (z) from (4) into (5) and using the linearity of W he ,
Uh1 (z) = αh [υ(q)− ρd] + ρz + δW h0 (0) + (1− δ)W h1 (0)
Something similar can be done for Uh0 . Inserting into (2), in steady state, the AD
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problem becomes
W he (z) = Ie + z +maxzˆ
{−zˆ + βαh [υ(q)− ρd] + βρzˆ}+ βEW heˆ (0) (7)
where the expectation is wrt next period’s employment status conditional on e. We
claim the KW terms of trade (q, d) may depend on zˆ but not on employment status
— see Section 3.1. Hence, from (7), the choice zˆ is independent of e, as well as Ie and
z.9
2.2 Firms
Firms carry no money out of AD. In the MP market, we have
Uf1 = δV
f
0 + (1− δ)V f1 (8)
Uf0 = λfV
f
1 + (1− λf)V f0 , (9)
where λf = N (u, v)/v = N (1, τ)/τ . This is standard. Where we deviate from
textbook MP theory is that, rather than having f and h each consume a share of the
output, here f takes it to the goods market and looks to trade with another h. Thus,
in the model, as in reality, households do not necessarily consume what they make
each day at work. Output in a match is denoted y, and measured in units of the AD
good. If f sells q units in KW, there is a transformation cost c(q), with c0 > 0 and
c00 ≥ 0, so that y − c(q) is left over to bring to the next AD market.10
9Recall that KW meetings are anonymous with probability ω = 1 in this benchmark. More
generally, the maximand in (7) should be
−zˆ + βαhω [υ(qm)− ρdm] + βαh(1− ω) [υ(qc)− ρdc] + βρzˆ
where (qm, dm) and (qc, dc) are the terms of trade in money and credit meetings, respectively. The
crucial difference is that money trades are constrained by dm ≤ zˆ while no such constraint applies
to credit trades. This implies the choice of zˆ is actually independent of (qc, dc). In fact, most of the
predictions are exactly the same for all values of ω > 0 as long as we adjust αh so αhω is constant.
See Section 4.3 for more on the model with ω < 1.
10We also solved the model where output is in KW goods, and there is a technology for transform-
ing unsold KW goods into AD goods. The results are essentially the same. One can alternatively
assume unsold KW goods are carried forward to the next KW market, but having f liquidate in-
ventory in AD avoids the problem of tracking inventories across f , just like the AD market allows
us to avoid tracking the distribution of money across h.
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For f in KW,
V f1 = αfW
f
1 [y − c(q), ρd] + (1− αf)W f1 (y, 0) (10)
where αf =M(B,S)/S. The AD value of f with inventory x, real balances z, and
wage commitment w is W f1 (x, z) = x+ z − w + βUf1 . Thus,
V f1 = R− w + β
h
δV f0 + (1− δ)V f1
i
, (11)
where R = y + αf [ρd− c(q)] is expected revenue. Obviously, the KW terms of trade
(q, d) affect R, and hence in equilibrium affect entry and employment, establishing
another link between goods and labor markets. And as long as f derives at least some
revenue from cash transactions, monetary factors affect labor market outcomes.
To model entry, as is standard, any f with e = 0 can pay k in units of x in the
AD market to enter the next MP market with a vacancy. Thus
W f0 = max
n
0,−k + βλfV f1 + β(1− λf)V f0
o
,
where V f0 =W
f
0 = 0 by free entry. Thus k = βλfV
f
1 , which by (11) implies
k =
βλf (R− w)
1− β(1− δ) . (12)
Profit over all firms is (1− u)(R− w)− vk, which they pay out as dividends. If the
representative h holds the representative portfolio (say, shares in a mutual fund) this
gives equilibrium dividend income ∆.
2.3 Government Policy
Government consumes G, pays UI benefit b, levies tax T , and prints money at rate π,
so that Mˆ = (1+π)M , and π equals inflation in steady state. The budget constraint
G + bu = T + πM/p holds at every date, without loss of generality, by Ricardian
equivalence. For steady state analysis, we can equivalently describe monetary policy
in terms of setting the nominal interest rate i or π, by virtue of the Fisher equation
1+ i = (1+π)/β. In the stochastic model in the Appendix we specify policy in terms
of interest rate rules. We always assume i > 0, although one can take the limit as
i→ 0, which is the Friedman rule.
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3 Equilibrium
We assume that agents are price takers in the AD market, and bargain over the
terms of trade in MP and KW.11 Given this, we determine steady state equilibrium
as follows. First, taking unemployment u as given, we solve for the value of money q
as in Lagos-Wright (2005). Then, taking q as given, we solve for u as in Mortensen-
Pissarides (1996). If we depict these results in (u, q) space as the LW curve and
MP curve, their intersection determines equilibrium unemployment and the value of
money, from which all other variables easily follow.
3.1 Goods Market Equilibrium
When f and hmeet in KW, the terms of trade (q, d) are determined by the generalized
Nash bargaining solution
max
q,d
[υ(q)− ρd]θ [ρd− c(q)]1−θ , (13)
s.t. d ≤ z and c(q) ≤ y, which say the parties cannot leave with negative cash
balances or inventories. The first term in (13) is the surplus of h and the second the
surplus of f , using the linearity of W je , while θ is the bargaining power of h. We
assume c(q) ≤ y is not binding. As established in Lagos-Wright, in any equilibrium,
the solution of (13) involves d = z and q = g−1(ρz), where
g(q) ≡ θc(q)υ
0(q) + (1− θ)υ(q)c0(q)
θυ0(q) + (1− θ)c0(q) . (14)
Notice ∂q/∂z = ρ/g0(q) > 0, so bringing more money gets h more KW goods, but
nonlinearly (unless θ = 1 and c is linear).
Given the bargaining outcome d = z and q = g−1(ρz), we can rewrite the the
choice of zˆ by h in AD as
max
zˆ≥0
©
−zˆ + βαhυ
£
g−1(ρz)
¤
+ β(1− αh)ρzˆ
ª
. (15)
11In Berentsen et al. (2008) we consider alternative pricing mechanisms for both MP and KW,
including price taking and price posting. Here we focus on bargaining because it is easy and standard
in the literatures on search unemployment and money.
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The solution is given by
1
βρ
= αh
υ0(q)
g0(q)
+ 1− αh. (16)
Using 1/βρ = 1 + i and αh =M(1, 1− u), we get
i
M(1, 1− u) =
υ0(q)
g0(qˆ)
− 1. (17)
This is the LW curve, determining q as in Lagos-Wright, except there αh was
fixed and here αh =M(1, 1 − u). Its properties follow from well-known results. For
instance, simple conditions guarantee the RHS of (17) is monotone, and hence there
is a unique solution q > 0, with ∂q/∂u < 0.12 Intuitively, the higher is unemployment
the lower is the probability that h matches in KW, which lowers the demand for
money, and reduces its value q. Also, given u, (17) implies q is decreasing in i. These
and other properties of the LW curve are summarized below.
Proposition 1 Let q∗ solve υ0(q∗) = c0(q∗). For all i > 0 the LW curve slopes
downward in (u, q) space, with u = 0 implying q ∈ (0, q∗) and u = 1 implying q = 0.
The curve shifts down with i and up with θ. As i→ 0, q → q0 for all u < 1, where q0
is independent of u, and q0 = q∗ iff θ = 1.
3.2 Labor Market Equilibrium
In MP, we use Nash bargaining over w with threat points given by continuation values
and η the bargaining power of f . It is routine to solve for
w =
η [1− β (1− δ)] (b+ c) + (1− η) [1− β (1− δ − λh)]R
1− β (1− δ) + (1− η)βλh
, (18)
exactly as in Mortensen-Pissarides. Substituting this and R = y + αf [ρd− c(q)] into
(12), the free entry condition becomes
k =
λfη [y − b− c+ αf (ρd− q)]
r + δ + (1− η)λh
. (19)
12Conditions that make the RHS of (17) monotone include decreasing absolute risk aversion, or
θ ≈ 1. Alternatively, the analysis in Wright (2009) implies there is generically a unique solution
with ∂q/∂u < 0 even if the RHS is not monotone.
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To simplify (19), use the steady state condition (1 − u)δ = N(u, v) to implicitly
define v = v(u) and write αf = M(1, 1 − u)/(1 − u), λf = N [u, v(u)]/v(u) and
λh = N [u, v(u)]/u. Using these plus ρd = g(q), (19) becomes
k =
ηN [u,v(u)]v(u)
n
y − b− c+ M(1,1−u)
1−u [g(q)− c(q)]
o
r + δ + (1− η)N [u,v(u)]u
. (20)
This is the MP curve, determining u as in Mortensen-Pissarides, except the total
surplus (the term in braces ) includes not just y− b− c but also the expected surplus
from KW trade. Routine calculations show the MP curve is downward sloping. In-
tuitively, when q is higher, profit and hence the benefit from opening a vacancy are
higher, so ultimately unemployment is lower. Also, given q, u is increasing in b, c
and k and decreasing in y. These and other properties of the MP curve are summa-
rized below, under a maintained assumption k(r + δ) < η [y − b− c+ g(q∗)− c(q∗)],
without which the market shuts down.
Proposition 2 The MP curve slopes downward in (u, q) space and passes through
(u, q∗), where u ∈ (0, 1). If k(r + δ) ≥ η(y − b − c) it passes through (1, q), where
q > 0, and if k(r + δ) < η(y − b − c) it passes through (u, 0), where u > 0. It shifts
to the right with b, c and k, and to the left with y.
3.3 General Equilibrium
The LW and MP curves both slope downward in the rectangle B = [0, 1] × [0, q∗]
in (u, q) space, as shown in a stylized way in Fig 3.1 (curves for actual calibrated
parameter values are shown in Section 4.2). LW enters B from the left at (0, q0)
and exits from the right at (1, 0). If k(r + δ) ≥ η(y − b − c), MP enters B from
the top at (q∗, u) and exits from the right at (1, q1). In this case, there exists a
nonmonetary equilibrium at (0, 1) and, depending on parameter values, there may
also exist monetary equilibria. If k(r+δ) < η(y− b− c), MP enters B from the top at
(q∗, u) and exits from the bottom at (0, u). In this case, there exists a nonmonetary
12
equilibrium at (0, u), and at least one monetary equilibrium. Generally, steady state
equilibrium exists but need not be unique. However, the monetary steady-state may
be unique, as was common in calibrated examples.13
Conveniently, changes in i shift only the LW curve, while changes in y, η, r, k, δ, b
or c shift only the MP curve. In particular, in monetary equilibrium, an increase in i
shifts the LW curve toward the origin, decreasing q and increasing u if the equilibrium
is unique (or, without uniqueness, in the ‘natural’ low-unemployment equilibrium).
The result ∂q/∂i < 0 holds in standard LW models, with fixed αh, but here there
is a general equilibrium multiplier effect: once q falls, u goes down and this reduces
αh, which further reduces q. The result ∂u/∂i > 0 is novel, since the nominal rate
has no role in standard MP models and there is no unemployment in standard LW
models. This effect captures the idea suggested by Friedman (1977) as discussed in
the Introduction. Intuitively, higher i increases the cost of holding money, leading h to
economize on real balances; this hurts retail trade, profit, and ultimately employment.
Other experiments can be analyzed similarly, and are left as exercises.14
Proposition 3 Steady state equilibrium exists. If k(r + δ) ≥ η(y − b− c), there is a
nonmonetary steady state at (0, 1) and there may also exist monetary steady states. If
k(r+ δ) < η(y− b− c), there is a nonmonetary steady state at (0, u) and at least one
monetary steady state. If the monetary steady-state is unique, a rise in i decreases q
and increases u, while a rise in y, or a fall in k, b or c, increases q and decreases u.
13Once we have (u, q), we easily recover v, αj , λj , z etc. In particular, given the AD nominal
price level p = M/g(q), the budget equation yields x for every h as a function of z and Ie. The
employed consume more x, although employed and unemployed consume the same q (but see Liu
2009 for extensions where this is not true). In the case mentioned in fn.7 with many AD goods and
utility x+Υe(x), standard consumer theory yields individual demand x = De(p), market demand
is D(p) = uD0(p) + (1 − u)D1(p), and equating this to supply yields a standard system of GE
equations that solve for p. Note that our model does not dichotomize, as some LW models do (see
Aruoba et al. 2008), and one cannot generally solve for AD and KW consumption independently.
14Consider an increase in b, which is the most basic experiment in labor models, like a change in
i is the most basic in monetary theory. This shifts the MP curve out, increasing u and reducing q
if the equilibrium is unique (or in ‘natural’ equilibrium). The result ∂u/∂b > 0 holds in standard
MP models, with fixed R, but now there is a general equilibrium multiplier effect. And ∂q/∂b < 0 is
novel, in the sense that standard MP models do not generate a value for money, and standard LW
models do not have a role for UI.
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4 Quantitative Analysis
We have constructed a framework to analyze labor and goods markets with frictions.
The model is tractable, and many results can be established by shifting curves, in-
cluding the result that increasing inflation raises unemployment through a qualitative
channel suggested by Friedman (1977). We now show the theory is amenable to quan-
titative analysis, by asking how well can it account for the low-frequency behavior
of u from 1955-2005, assuming (counterfactually) the only driving force is monetary
policy. Although Section 3 considered steady states, here we use the generalization
in the Appendix, with a stochastic process for productivity y, and a policy rule that
gives next period’s nominal ratebi as a function of i: bi = i+ρi(i−i)+i, i ∼ N(0, σi).
4.1 Parameters and Targets
We choose a model period as one quarter. In terms of parameters, preferences are
described by the discount factor β, the value of leisure c, and υ(q) = Aq1−α/(1− α).
Technology is described by the vacancy cost k, the job-destruction rate δ, and c(q) =
qγ. Matching is described by N (u, v) = Zu1−σvσ (truncated to keep probabilities
below 1), as in much of the literature following Mortensen-Pissarides (1994), and
M(B,S) = BS/(B + S), following Kiyotaki-Wright (1993). Policy is described by a
UI benefit b and a stochastic process for i summarized by (i, ρi, σi). Finally, we have
bargaining power parameters in MP and KW, η and θ.
We set β so the real interest rate in the model matches the data, measured as the
difference between the rate on Aaa bonds and realized inflation. We set (i, ρi, σi) to
match the average, autocorrelation, and standard deviation of the nominal rate. The
parameters k, δ, Z, σ, η and b are fixed using the standard approach in the macro-
labor literature (see e.g. Shimer 2005 or Menzio and Shi 2009). Thus, k and δ match
the average unemployment rate and UE (unemployment-to-employment) transition
rate; Z is normalized so that the vacancy rate is 1; σ is to set match the regression
coefficient of v/u on the UE transition rate; η is equated to σ (the Hosios rule); and
b is set so UI benefits are half of average wages.
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We then set A, α, γ and θ as in the related money literature (see e.g. Aruoba et
al. 2008). First, set A and α so the relationship between money demand M/pY and
i is the same in the model and data. In the model,
M
pY
=
M/p
Y
=
g(q)
(1− u) {αf [g(q)− c(q)] + y} , (21)
which depends on i via q and u, and on A and α via the function g(q). Although
there are alternative ways to fit this relation, we set A to match average M/pY and
α to match the empirical elasticity, usingM1 as our measure of money.15 Notice (21)
also involves γ in c(q) and θ in g(q). For now we set γ = 1 (see below), and set θ so
the markup in KW matches the data, which according to the retail data summarized
by Faig and Jerex (2005) means a target markup of 30 percent (see Aruoba et al.
2008 for more discussion).
The targets discussed above and summarized in Table 1 are sufficient to pin down
all but one parameter, the value of leisure c. As is well known, the literature has
not reached a consensus on how to set this. For instance, Shimer (2005) assumes
c = 0; Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) calibrate it using the cost of hiring and find
that (b+ c) /y = 0.95; and Hall and Milgrom (2008) calibrate it using consumption
data and find that (b+ c) /y = 0.71. Here we follow a different strategy, and set c so
that the model implies that, at the business cycle frequency, measured fluctuations
in productivity y (holding monetary policy fixed) account for 2/3 of the observed
fluctuations in u. While the exact target is somewhat arbitrary, this method reflects
a common view, articulated in Mortensen and Nagypal (2006), that productivity is a
major but not the only cause of cyclical fluctuations in labor markets.16
15We use M1 mainly to facilitate comparison with the literature. Although at first blush it may
seem M0 better suits the theory, one can reformulate this kind of model so that demand deposits
circulate in KW, either instead of or along with currency (Berentsen et al. 2007, He et al. 2007, or
Chiu and Meh 2009, Li 2009). Also, to pin down the share of the KW market in total output, simply
divide nominal KW spending M(1, 1 − u)M by pY . With our calibration, KW accounts for 42%
and AD 58% of GDP (which differs from e.g. Aruoba et al. 2008, since the models are different).
16We present robustness results on this (and other parameters) below. We also tried some alter-
native calibration strategies: Berentsen et al. (2008) report results when c is set as in Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008), and when it is set to minimize deviations between predicted and actual u. While
the details differ, the overall message is similar.
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Table 1: Calibration Targets
Description Value
average unemployment u .006
average vacancies v (normalization) 1
average UE rate λh (monthly) .450
elasticity of λhwrt v/u .280
firm’s bargaining power in MP η .280
average UI replacement rate b/w .500
average money demand M/pY (annual) .179
elasticity of M/pY wrt i (negative) .556
elasticity γ of cost function 1
retail sector markup .300
average nominal interest rate i (annual) .074
autocorrelation of i (quarterly) .989
standard deviation of i .006
average real interest rate r (annual) .033
Table 2: Calibrated Parameters
Description Baseline Markup Leisure Elasticity
β discount factor .992 .992 .992 .992
c value of leisure .504 .517 .514 .491
A KW utility weight 1.08 1.10 1.07 1.10
α KW utility elasticity .179 .211 .179 .105
δ job destruction rate .050 .050 .050 .050
k vacancy posting cost (10−4) 8.44 8.68 6.47 8.25
Z MP matching efficiency .364 .364 .364 .364
σ MP matching velasticity .280 .280 .280 .280
η MP firm bargaining share .280 .280 .280 .280
θ KW firm bargaining share .275 .225 .275 .275
Table 2 summarizes parameter values. The first column is for the baseline calibra-
tion described above. For robustness, we also present three alternative calibrations in
the other columns. In the first alternative, labeled Markup, we set θ so that the KW
markup is 40% rather than 30%. In the second, labeled Leisure, we set c so that at the
business cycle frequency the model accounts for all rather than 2/3 of unemployment
volatility in response to fluctuations in y. In the third, labeled Elasticity, we set α
so that the elasticity of money demand is −1 rather than −0.556 as in the base case.
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Although these alternatives are somewhat arbitrary, they suffice to illustrate how and
how much the results depend on parameter values.
4.2 Results
Using the calibrated parameters, we compute equilibrium for the model when i and y
follow stochastic processes, as described in the Appendix. Then we input the actual
time series for i, holding y constant, and compute the implied path of u. To focus
on longer-run behavior, we pass u through an HP filter to eliminate higher-frequency
fluctuations. The resulting series is our prediction of what trend unemployment would
have been if monetary policy had been the only driving force over the period.
Table 3: 1972-1992
u 1972(1) u 1982(1) u 1992(1) ∆1972-1982 ∆1982-1992
Data 5.33 8.16 6.48 2.83 -1.68
Baseline 5.83 7.02 5.96 1.19 -1.06
Markup 5.83 7.97 6.02 2.14 -1.95
Leisure 5.83 7.91 6.01 2.08 -1.90
Elasticity 5.83 7.55 6.02 1.72 -1.53
All data is passed through a 1600 HP-filter
For the baseline calibration, Fig. 4.1 plots time-series for the actual and coun-
terfactual trend u (as well as the unfiltered series). It is apparent that money could
have been responsible for a large part of the movements in u: the model indicates e.g.
that changes in i alone can account for over 40% of the 2.83 increase in u between
1972 and 1982, and over 60% of the 1.68 point decline between 1982 and 1992, as
seen in Table 3. Between 1992 and 2005, i also accounts for the overall decline in u,
if not all the fluctuations. The 1960s are the only big subperiod where actual and
counterfactual u move in opposite directions.17 Fig. 4.2 shows the scatter plot of
17There is clearly no hope of explaining movements in u in the 60s as a function of movements
in i alone, since theory predicts ∂u/∂i < 0. We can however say the decline in u in this subperiod
was due to other factors, like increased productivity, and slack monetary policy actually prevented
unemployment from falling by more. Quantitatively, we need to increase y from 1 to 1.0275 during
the 60s to explain lower u despite higher i during that decade, We leave more detailed exploration
of this idea to future work.
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actual u and i in blue, and of counterfactual predicted u and i in red, where we note
that the relationship between counterfactual u and i is close to the linear regression
on the actual data. Fig. 4.3 replaces the nominal rate with inflation, and delivers
similar results.
Table 3 also summarizes the results from the alternative calibrations. As one can
see, monetary policy accounts for a larger fraction of the movements in trend u if we
target a higher retail mark-up, if we assume that y shocks account for a larger fraction
of fluctuations in u at the business cycle frequency, or if we assume money demand
is more elastic. Fig. 4.4 shows the case where c is higher. To understand the results,
note that y and i have different effects on R, but conditional on having a given effect
on R, they have the same effect on u. If u responds more to y, as it does when c is
higher, then it also responds more to i. If the elasticity of money demand is higher
or the mark-up is higher, a change in i shock has a larger effect on R. One can also
interpret these in terms of shifts and slopes of the MP and LW curves (which conveys
the economic intuition, even though Section 3.3 only considered steady states). If c
increases, e.g., the MP curve flattens out, so that a shift in LW from a change in i
induces a larger increase in u, as shown in Fig. 4.5.
From these counterfactual analyses, we conclude that monetary policy can be im-
portant for understanding the low-frequency performance of the US labor market, at
least over the period 1955-2005. This conclusion is independent of nominal rigidities,
imperfect information, and any other channel that may or may not be relevant at
high frequencies. Moreover, we conclude that the importance of monetary policy on
the performance of the labor market in the long run is stronger, the higher is the
mark-up in the retail sector, the higher is the elasticity of money demand, and the
higher is the contribution of productivity shocks to cyclical unemployment.
4.3 Financial Innovation
The baseline model generates a relationship between nominal interest rates and money
demand that closely resembles its empirical counterpart up until the 1990s. However,
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during the 1990s, M/pY is systematically lower for all nominal interest rates — the
money demand curve shifts down — and for this period the baseline parameters do
not match the data well. This is a concern, because as we argued in the previous
subsection, the shape of money demand plays an important role in determining the
effect of i on u. Therefore, here we carry out the same analysis of the effect of
monetary policy on trend unemployment in a simple generalization of the model that
is better able to reproduce the empirical money demand data.18
Recall the model discussed in Section 2, where ω is the probability a meeting in
KW is anonymous, and hence the probability money is needed for trade. We now
allow ω to differ before and after 1990. This is meant to capture in a crude but
reasonable way the idea that the downward shift in money demand curve was due
to innovations in payments, such as the proliferation of credit cards in retail, and
perhaps other innovations, like ATMs, sweep accounts etc. that allow households to
economize on liquid balances. We keep ω = 1 from 1955-1990, and set ω = 0.62 after
1990 to match average M/pY in the latter period, with the other parameters set to
match the same targets as the baseline calibration.19 Given these parameter values,
we compute equilibrium under the assumption that a one-time unexpected change in
ω occurred, which is again crude but we think illustrative. Then we feed in the actual
path for i and compute the predicted path for u.
Fig. 4.6 presents the money demand curve generated by the model with financial
innovation in purple and the baseline model in red, as well as actual money demand
in green. The model with financial innovation generates a money demand curve that
has a higher mean and elasticity before 1990, and a much lower mean after 1990.
Generally, with financial innovation, money demand in the model is closer to the
18This exercise is very similar in spirit to the analysis by Guerierri and Lorenzoni (2008) in a
related model.
19By comparison, Aruoba et al. (2008) argue for ω = 0.88, to match Klee’s (2008) finding that
shoppers use credit cards (as opposed to cash, checks and debit cards) for 12% of supermarket
transactions in the scanner data. This is close to the 16% Cooley and Hansen (1991) report was
found in earlier consumer survey data). While future work on matching micro payments data is
clearly desirable, we think calibrating to aggregate money demand suffices for the points we want
to make here.
19
data. Figure 4.7 shows actual trend unemployment u in blue, and the path for trend
u predicted by the model with financial innovation(in purple by the baseline model
in red. Clearly, the model with financial innovation implies monetary policy accounts
for a much larger fraction of the movement in u during the earlier part of the sample,
and about the same fraction in the latter part.
Overall, once we allow for financial innovation, the model fits much better the
empirical money demand curve, and implies that monetary policy accounts for a
larger fraction of the movement in trend unemployment over the period. This result
provides another a robustness check on the earlier results. Additionally, this extension
implies that the observed shift in money demand is likely to reduce the impact of
monetary policy on the labor market in the future. In Figure 4.8 the black line shows
the path for trend u assuming ω = 0.62 over the entire period 1955-2005. In this
case, the inflation of the 1970s would have had a much smaller effect on u, e.g., and
hence we can predict that in the future, assuming money demand does not shift back,
inflation will not lead to as large an increase in unemployment as we observed during
stagflation, say.
5 Comparison with Cash in Advance
A question often comes up in this kind of research is, why do we need monetary
theory with microfoundations? At one level, we obviously do not need the search-
and-bargaining approach to study the effect of money on unemployment, since some
of the papers mentioned in the Introduction use cash-in-advance (henceforth CIA)
models. One doesn’t even need a model in the modern sense — we could use the
IS-LM approach combined with Okun’s Law. The interesting issue is not one of need,
but whether it makes a difference for the results when one uses, say, the search-and-
bargaining or CIA framework. To discuss this issue, here we consider the model with
an otherwise frictionless and competitive goods market — i.e. no search or bargaining
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— but impose a CIA constraint.20
We will compare the models in two ways: examine the mechanisms through which
money matters analytically; and use calibrated versions to contrast results numer-
ically. For the first approach, without going through the rudimentary details, the
setup with CIA but otherwise no frictions in KW generates a demand for q given by
υ0(q) = (1 + i)c0
µ
q
1− u
¶
. (22)
The LHS is the MRS between q and x, and the RHS is the opportunity cost of q
in terms of x, including the interest cost 1 + i and the marginal cost c0 evaluated at
the equilibrium quantity produced by a firm active in the market (i.e. one that is
matched with a worker). An increase in i raises the cost due to the CIA constraint,
while an increase in u raises marginal cost for each active f , since there are fewer of
them, increasing the price of q. Hence an increase in either i or u reduces demand for
KW goods.
By comparison, in our search and bargaining model, demand for the KW good
satisfies
υ0(q) =
µ
1 +
i
αh
¶
g0(q). (23)
There are two differences between (22) and (23). First, because of search frictions, h
only gets to trade in the KWmarket with probability αh, making the effective interest
rate i/αh, instead of i. Second, f has market power in KW, making the effective price
g0(q) rather than c0(q), where g(q) is the bargaining solution described above. In our
model, an increase in i reduces the demand for q, as in the CIA model, but the effect
is larger, given αh < 1 and given g(q) is typically less convex than c(q). Moreover,
in our model an increase in u affects q by lowering the probability of trade, which is
different from the CIA model, where an increase in u simply means that each active
f has to produce more to get the same total q.
20There is no model in the literature that does exactly this, although Andofatto et al. (2003)
and Cooley and Quadrini (2004) do use CIA models. However, to give the reduced-form approach a
chance, we really need to have both cash and credit goods, since a simple CIA model cannot match
well the empirical money demand.
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Additionally, in both models the entry (vacancy posting) decision of f is based
on expected revue R, but in the CIA model,
R = c0
µ
q
1− u
¶
q
1− u − c
µ
q
1− u
¶
+ y. (24)
The first term on the RHS is revenue from KW sales, the second is the cost, and the
last term is revenue from AD sales. An increase in the demand for q increases R in
the CIA model by increasing the difference between the revenue and cost associated
with the KW good, and an increase in u increases R by increasing marginal cost and
hence equilibrium price of the KW good.
By comparison, in our model
R = αf [g(q)− c(q)] + y. (25)
An increase in q here increases R by raising the surplus f gets from KW sales,
g(q) − c(q). This is similar to the effect of q on R in the CIA model, except with
bargaining the magnitude of the effect depends not only on the shape of the cost
function but depends also on the utility function and bargaining power. Additionally,
an increase in u raises R in our model by increasing the firm’s probability of KW
trade αf , an effect that is completely absent in the CIA model. We conclude that
the channels via which q affects u, as well as the channels via which u affects q, are
qualitatively different in the models, as is the impact of a change in i.
We not turn to a quantitative comparison. First, consider the case in which cost
c(q) = qγ is linear: γ = 1. In the CIAmodel, an increase in i increases the opportunity
cost of holding money, which reduces the demand for KW goods, but with linear cost
and a competitive market, the price of q goods and hence R are completely unaffected
by this decline in demand. Therefore, in the CIA model, with linear cost, an increase
in i has no effect on the incentive for f to open vacancies in the MP market and hence
no effect on u. By contrast, in our model f has market power and price exceeds cost
in KW. Thus, R is falls with a the decline in demand in our model, so an increase
in i reduces vacancies and employment. In our calibrated model, increasing inflation
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from 0 to 10% raises u from 5.2 to 7.4 across steady states, but does literally nothing
to u in the CIA model.
That was for linear cost. Suppose now cost is convex: γ > 1. Then the price
of KW goods exceeds average cost, and R does depend on demand even in the CIA
model. Thus a fall in demand for q reduces vacancies and employment even in the
CIA model. In a calibrated version (see Table 4), increasing inflation from 0 to 10%
raises u from 5.4 to 6.6 when we set γ = 1.05, and from 5.4 to 6.8 when we set
γ = 1.10. By comparison, the same policy increases u from 5.2 to 7.9 when we set
γ = 1.05, and from 5.1 to 8.7 when we set γ = 1.10. Thus our model generates
much bigger effects, mainly because the share of the surplus accruing to f in KW is
determined differently, and is both larger and more sensitive to changes in demand.
Table 4: Calibrated Parameters
γ = 1 γ = 1.05 γ = 1.1
BMW CIA BMW CIA BMW CIA
β .992 .992 .992 .992 .992 .992
c .504 .480 .511 .497 .517 .513
A 1.08 1.01 1.13 1.04 1.21 1.08
α .179 .030 .156 .001 1.13 .001
δ .050 .050 .050 .050 .050 .050
k 8.44 4.11 8.56 4.25 8.68 4.40
Z .364 .364 .364 .364 .364 .364
σ .720 .720 .720 .720 .720 .720
η .280 .280 .280 .280 .280 .280
θ .275 — .250 — .275 —
In both models, increasing the convexity of c(q) magnifies the response of u to
changes in i, but also dampens the response of M/PY to changes in i, and makes it
harder to match the empirical elasticity of money demand. Intuitively, the higher is
γ, the smaller the effect of an increase in i on q and hence onM/PY . Quantitatively,
the CIA model can match the elasticity of M/PY for γ = 1, but fails for γ = 1.05
or higher: for γ ≥ 1.05, there are no parameters of the utility function υ(q) that
make the CIA model look like the empirical money demand curve. In contrast, our
model can match the empirical money demand curve for γ = 1, 1.05 or 1.10. This is
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because, in our model, h faces an effective interest rate of i/αh, rather than simply
i, and hence an increase in i has a larger effect on q and M/PY . So to the extent
that one is disciplined by money demand, and not free to pick cost functions totally
arbitrarily, our model predicts a bigger quantitative impact of monetary policy on
the labor market that the CIA model. Fig 5.1 summarizes the results.
These comparisons show that the search-and-bargaining foundations for money
matter a lot. First, because frictions give market power to f in KW, i has a stronger
effect on u in our setup for any specification of c(q). Second, because frictions imply
that h trades only probabilistically in KW, i has a stronger effect on M/pY in our
model, and hence we are better able to match the empirical money demand elasticity.21
For the CIA model to match the elasticity of money demand, c(q) must be close to
linear, and hence the Phillips curve must be approximately flat. Our model can match
the elasticity for more general cost functions, and for any of them, including the linear
case, we can get large effects of i on u. We conclude that while one may not need
microfoundations, they do matter for the results.
6 Conclusion
This paper has studied the relation between unemployment and monetary variables
like inflation or nominal interest rates. We first documented that these variables are
positively related in the low frequency data. We then developed a very tractable
framework where money and unemployment are both modeled using microfounda-
tions based on search-and-bargaining, providing a unified theory for analyzing labor
and goods markets. We then showed the model is amenable to quantitative analysis
by asking how well it can account for unemployment behavior when the only impulse
is monetary policy. We found that changes in monetary policy alone can generate
a sizable fraction of historical movements in unemployment, although probably will
generate less in the future given shifts in money demand explicable in terms of inno-
vations in payments. Finally, we asked if it matters, qualitatively and quantitatively,
21See also Telyukova and Visshers (2009).
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whether one uses monetary economics based on search-and-bargaining microfounda-
tions or monetary economics based on an ad hoc cash-in-advance specification. The
answer is yes — it does matter.
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Appendix: The Dynamic-Stochastic Model
At the beginning of a period, the state is s = (u, i, y), where u is unemployment,
i the nominal rate and y productivity. The state s was known in the previous AD
market, including the return on nominal bonds maturing this period. Although these
bonds are not traded in equilibrium, i matters because it pins down the expected
return on real balances ρˆ(s) = E[ρ(sˆ)|s] via the no-arbitrage condition 1 = β(1 +
i)ρˆ(s). The nominal rate and productivity follow exogenous (independent) processes:
ıˆ = i+ ρi(i− i) + i, i ∼ N(0, σi)
yˆ = y + ρy(y − y) + y, y ∼ N(0, σy)
Unemployment behaves as follows. In MP, each unemployed h finds a job with
probability λh[τ(s)] and f with a vacancy fills it with probability λf [τ(s)], where
τ(s) = v/u and v = v(s) was set in the previous AD market. Therefore, at the
beginning of KW,
uˆ(s) = u− uλh[τ(s)] + (1− u)δ.
When h and f meet in MP, w(s) is determined by generalized Nash bargaining, but
is paid (in units of x) in AD; w(s) can be renegotiated in MP each period.
In KW market, h meets f with probability αh [Q(s)] and f meets h with proba-
bility αf [Q(s)], where Q(s) = 1/ [1− uˆ(s)], whence q(z, s) and d(z, s) are determined
according to generalized Nash bargaining, where z denotes real balances held by h.
After KW, in the AD market, the realization of sˆ becomes known, f liquidates inven-
tories, pays wages and dividends, and create v(sˆ) vacancies for the next MP. Also, h
chooses z(sˆ), and government collects T (sˆ), pays b, and announces ıˆ.
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In MP, taking as given the equilibrium wage function w(s), the value functions
for h are
Uh0 (z; s) = V
h
0 (z; s) + λh[τ(s)]
©
V h1 [z, w(s); s]− V h0 (z; s)
ª
Uh1 (z; s) = V
h
1 [z, w(s); s]− δ
©
V h1 [z, w(s); s]− V h0 (z; s)
ª
.
In KW, taking as given the equilibrium terms of trade q(z; s) and d(z; s),
V h0 (z; s) = αh
∙
1
1− uˆ(s)
¸
{υ [q(z; s)]− ρˆ(s)d(z; s)}+ ρˆ(s) [z − d(z; s)] + EW h0 (0; sˆ)
V h1 (z, w; s) = αh
∙
1
1− uˆ(s)
¸
{υ [q(z; s)]− ρˆ(s)d(z; s)}+ ρˆ(s) [z − d(z; s)] + EW h1 (0, w; sˆ),
using the linearity of W he (·; sˆ). Finally, in AD,
W h0 (z; sˆ) = z + b+ c+∆(sˆ)− T (sˆ) + maxzˆ≥0
©
−zˆ + βUh0 (zˆ; sˆ)
ª
W h1 (z, w; sˆ) = z + w +∆(sˆ)− T (sˆ) + maxzˆ≥0
©
−zˆ + βUh1 (zˆ; sˆ)
ª
.
Let z(sˆ) be solution to the above maximization, d(s) = d [z(s); s] and q(s) = q [z(s); s].
For f , in MP, taking as given w(s), the value functions are
Uf0 (s) = λf [τ(s)]V
f
1 [w(s); s]
Uf1 (s) = (1− δ)V f1 [w(s); s].
In KW, taking as given q(z; s), d(z; s) and z(s),
V f1 (w; s) = αf
h
1
1−uˆ(s)
i
{ρˆ(s)d(s)− c[q(s)]}+ βEW f1 (0, y, w; sˆ).
And in AD,
W f0 (sˆ) = max{0,−k + Uf0 (sˆ)}
W f1 (z, y, w; sˆ) = y + z − w + βUf1 (sˆ).
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In MP the surplus of a match is
S(s) = V h1 [z, w; s] + V
f
1 [w; s]− V h0 (z; s),
where we note that both z and w vanish on the right hand side. The bargaining
solution implies w(s) is such that
V h1 [z, w(s); s]− V h0 (z; s) = (1− η)S(s)
V f1 [w(s); s] = ηS(s).
In KW, bargaining solution implies that d(z; s) = z and q(z; s) is such that ρˆ(s)z =
g [q(z; s)], with g(q) as defined in the text.
The transition probability function P(sˆ; s) is constructed from the laws of motion
for i, y, and u in the obvious way. Then a Recursive Equilibrium is a list of functions
S(s), q(s), τ(s), and P(sˆ; s) such that:
S(s) = y + b− c+ αf
h
1
1−uˆ(s)
i
{g[q(s)]− c[q(s)]}+ βE{1− δ − (1− η)λh[τ(sˆ)]}S(sˆ);
i
αh
h
1
1−uˆ(s)
i = υ0 [q(s)]
g0 [q(s)]
− 1;
k = βλf [τ(s)]ηS(s);
and P is consistent with the law of motion for (i, u, y). Now standard methods in
quantitative macroeconomics allow us to solve for the equilibrium functions numer-
ically. See http://www.wwz.unibas.ch/witheo/aleks/BMWII/BMWII.html for de-
tails, including programs for calibration and simulation.
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